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Abstract 
The 2008 reform of the Spanish disability system reduced the benefits for individuals 
who have a short contributory history relative to their age. It also unintentionally 
introduced an incentive for individuals to apply for disability in the present. We use a 
lifecycle model and an empirical analysis to understand the overall impact of the 
reform. Our baseline estimates suggest that men and women who were affected by the 
reform were 46 and 22 percent more likely to be on permanent partial disability 
following the reform, respectively, and 55 and 46 percent more likely to be on total 
disability, respectively. 
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Growing rates of disability in industrialized nations place a strain on government 
budgets; thus, countries have become progressively more interested in both curbing 
disability entry and reintegrating disabled individuals into the workforce (Autor & 
Duggan, 2003; Chen & Van der Klaauw, 2008). We evaluate one such effort in Spain, 
which aimed to lower the overall fiscal burden of providing disability benefits. We 
found that although the reform did lower benefit amounts, it had the unintended 
consequence of incentivizing individuals to apply for disability earlier in their life cycle.  
In 2008, the Spanish government introduced a reform in the contributory disability 
insurance (DI) system that considered the number of years an individual had contributed 
to the system up to that point. The reform treated all future years up to the retirement 
age of 65 as contributory years. Individuals with less than 35 contributory years (actual 
years contributed plus the individual’s remaining years until 65) were subject to the 
reform and received a reduced benefit amount. 
The reform introduced two opposing incentives for disability application. On the one 
hand, the absolute value of disability benefits decreased for those under the 35 
contributory year threshold. On the other hand, in the present, future years are counted 
as contributory years. Individuals’ current benefits will be at a maximum if they expect 
low labor force attachment going forward; therefore, they are incentivized to apply for 
disability now. Our analysis suggests that the second effect dominated the first. 
Utilizing a large administrative dataset, we estimated that the reform increased the 
probability of DI entry by 46 percent for men and 22 percent for women. The effects are 
stronger for individuals with a higher degree of disability. Consistent with the 
predictions of a theoretical model, the effect of the reform is greater for individuals who 
had higher wages or could reasonably expect their contributory years to decrease in the 
future. 
A confounding factor for our analysis is that the reform overlapped with the years of the 
Great Recession. Through increased unemployment, the recession may have created 
more conditional applicants (Autor and Duggan 2003; Maestas, Mullen, and Strand 
2015), who are individuals with health impairments who would prefer to remain in the 
labor force but apply for disability upon job loss. We provide several additional 
robustness checks to show that our observed effects are not the sole result of the Great 
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Recession or by time invariant unobserved heterogeneity between the control (those 
unaffected by the reform) and treatment (those affected by the reform) groups.  
Several recent papers have examined reforms made to disability systems and show that 
the design of a disability system can have a significant effect on applications.
1
 In the 
1990s, and early 2000s, the Dutch government changed the replacement ratios, 
experience rating, and vocational rehabilitation plans and enacted stricter examination 
criteria (for a summary of these reforms, see Koning and Lindeboom, 2015). All of 
these reforms reduced the inflow rate into DI (Van Sonsbeek et al. 2013, Autor 2011). 
Most notably, De Jong et al. (2011) showed that stricter screening of disability 
applicants led to a reduction in long-term sickness absenteeism and a decline in 
disability insurance applications. Similar results were found in Finland by Korkeamäki 
et al. (2012), in which changes in the stringency of medical screening have had a direct 
effect on transitions into disability. Staubli (2011) analyzed a reform that increased the 
age at which conditions for disability insurance benefits are relaxed and found that 
enrollment to the disability system declined by 6 to 7.4 percentage points due to the 
policy change. In the Swedish context, Karlström et al. (2008) showed that abolishing 
special eligibility rules for workers aged 60 to 64 led to a small reduction in the 
entrance to disability after the reform. With respect to the private system, Autor et al. 
(2014) analyzed changes in the plan parameters of a large private long-term disability 
insurer and found that introducing lower replacement rates and longer waiting times 
significantly decreased the probability of applying for disability benefits. For Spain 
specifically, a recent paper by Vall Castello (2017) focused on a reform that abolished 
financial penalties to work for disabled individuals in one Spanish province. The reform 
increased the probability of working by 42 percent for disabled men in that province.
2
   
Although the aforementioned reforms were largely successful in their aims, the Spanish 
reform was not and therefore reveals considerations for future policy-makers. First, 
reforms must take into account the dynamic nature of disability insurance. In a one-
period setting, the Spanish reform lowered the incentive to apply for disability. 
However, in a multiperiod setting, the reform increased the incentive to apply in the 
present. Governments must be careful to consider how any change will affect the future 
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 Several previous papers also analyzed policies to re-integrate the disabled into the labor market 
(Campolieti and Riddell 2012: Gruber 2000; Gruber and Kubik 1997; Marie and Vall Castello 2012).  
2
 Other papers have focused on Spain but address additional topics in disability policies such as the 
employment promotion of disabled workers (Silva and Vall Castello, 2017 or Marie and Vall Castello, 
2012) or the impact of the Great Recession on disability inflows (Jimenez-Martin et al. 2017). 
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benefits stream for their reforms to have the desired effect. Consistent with Kreider 
(1998), who showed that uncertainty about future earnings increases disability 
application as individuals seek benefits to avoid labor market risks, we find that a 
primary driver of disability application is low expected labor force participation.
3
 In a 
context of depressed labor market opportunities, the steady income stream of disability 
is appealing. This result suggests that in times of economic uncertainty, disability rates 
may increase even if benefit amounts are low.  
2. THE 2008 REFORM 
The Spanish Social Security administration classifies disability by degree: partial, total, 
and severe; the degree depends on the working capacity lost. Partial disability includes 
individuals who are impaired for the fundamental tasks of their job or professional 
activity but are still capable of a different job or professional activity.
4
 Total disability 
occurs when the individual is impaired for all jobs and professional activities; severe 
disability is reserved for individuals who, as a result of anatomic or functional losses, 
require the assistance of a third person to aid in the essential activities of daily living. 
Given the small size (only 3 percent of the disability recipients) and inherent differences 
that characterize the severely disabled population, we excluded them from the analysis.
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For those eligible to receive a disability benefit, the benefit amount is multiplied by a 
percentage depending on the type of the disability: 55 percent for partial disability 
beneficiaries and 100 percent for total disability.
 6
 It is also important to note that a key 
distinction of the Spanish system is that many other disability systems require exit from 
full-time work upon disability receipt. In Spain, however, individuals may still work, as 
long as the job is not similar to the job held at the time of disability. 
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 All the results of the empirical model are for disability entry (not disability applications). However, we 
believe that our results may be extended to disability application behavior because the acceptance rate 
does not change after the reform. Individuals will also have uncertainty about the probability of 
acceptance; however, an individual’s perceived acceptance probability should not differ before or after 
the reform. 
4
 It is important to note that even if partially disabled individuals are allowed to work, Silva et al. 2017 
show that employment survival rates for newly partially disabled individuals are extremely low (1%) in 
Spain. 
5
 The application decision-making process for severe disability is likely different than the process for 
partial and total disability. We assume throughout the paper that individuals have some control over the 
timing of their disability application; this is not the case for severe disability because some form of social 
support is necessary given the seriousness of the condition. 
6
 To be eligible to receive a disability benefit, individuals must have contributed to the system for 1/4 of 
the years from the age of 20 until the age of their disability onset, with a minimum of 5 years. The 
eligibility requirements for those under 30 are slightly different. Because of these differences and because 




2.1 Disability formula after 2008 reform 
In 2008, Spain reformed its disability system with the aim of discouraging applications 
from individuals who did not have long contributory histories.
7
 They did this by 
reducing the amount of benefits to individuals deemed to have short contributory 
histories relative to their age. However, what constituted a long or short contributory 
history? The government defined a new variable that we refer to as potential plus actual 
contributory years (hereafter PAC years), which is constructed as follows: 
                     
                                      
                  
                         
 
The formula gives individuals credit for the years that they have contributed to the 
Social Security system, and it assumes they will contribute for every year for the 
remainder of their working years (65 - current age). This assumption of full contribution 
for the remainder of the working years was made to avoid penalizing young workers 
who suffered from a disability early in their labor market career. 
Disability benefit amounts for individuals with over 35 PAC years were untouched by 
the reform, whereas individuals below the 35 PAC year threshold had their benefit 
amount reduced by a percentage based on their PAC years. 
Table 1. Benefit formula before/after the reform. 
Benefit 
 
Before the Reform 
Base*Type Percentage 
 
After the Reform 




Ordinary illness: 0.86*average monthly wage last 8 years. 
Work unrelated accident: 0.86* average monthly wage in 
highest 24 earning months of the past 7 years. 
Work related accident/illness: average wage of the past 
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The law was published in the BOE (Boletin Oficial del Estado) on December 5, 2007 and came into 
effect on January 1, 2008. The law was not discussed in any of the major newspapers in Spain. Only a 
few organizations of people with disabilities explained the content of the new law in their websites. 
However, this information in specialized websites was published at the end of December, only a few days 








Total Disability: 100% 
Severe Disability: 100%+50% 
PAC Percentage 
Ranges from 50% for those with less than 15 PAC years to 
100% for those with 35 or more PAC years 
 
The PAC percentage, the new element introduced by the 2008 reform, takes a minimum 
value of 50 percent when the individual has 15 (or less) PAC years and gradually 
increases with the number of PAC years up to a maximum value of 100 for individuals 
with 35 (or more) PAC years.
9
  
The PAC years calculation has one key feature: PAC years can only decrease as one 
ages. For each year that passes, an individual loses a potential year, but if they worked, 
they gain an actual contributory year, and thus, their PAC years are unchanged. 
However, if they do not work, their PAC years decrease by one year. Figure 1 illustrates 
the dynamics of PAC years over two hypothetical life courses. 
In the figure, we simulate the PAC experience for two individuals, one with a labor 
market trajectory of full employment and the other with a labor market career in which 
the individual works only half the time. Both enter the labor market at age 25 with zero 
years contributed to the social security system, but they have 40 PAC years because of 
their 40 potential years remaining in the work force. For the individual with high labor 
force attachment, their PAC years remain at 40 for their life cycle because each lost 
potential year of age is replaced with an actual contributory year. The individual with 
low labor force attachment gradually loses PAC years because for every potential year 
that they lose as they age, they replace it with only 0.5 actual contributory years (Panel 
B). Both the low and high labor force attachment individuals have a full percentage 
(100) during their initial years in the labor force. However, the low labor force 
attachment individual crosses the 35 PAC year threshold at age 37, and thereafter the 
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 Individuals older than 55 who experience difficulties finding a job due to lack of education or 
characteristics of the social and labor market of the region where they live can obtain 75% of the 
regulatory base. 
9
 Table A4 in online appendix 3 shows the corresponding percentages for each PAC year. 
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PAC percentage applied to their disability amount decreases for the remainder of their 
working years. 
Figure 1. Simulation of the effects of the reform for two different individuals 
 
2.2 Trends in disability rates, pre and post 2008 reform 
In Figure 2, we calculated the average entry rates into disability over time for two 
different regimes (partial disability and total disability). Figures 2A and 2B plot the 
rates for men whereas Figures 2C and 2D show the same for women. The figures show 
the disability entry rates for three groups: all individuals, those affected by the reform 
(<35 PAC years), and those unaffected by the reform (≥35 PAC years). Figures 2A, 2B, 
2C, and 2D show that those affected and those unaffected by the reform exhibit similar 
trends in disability entry until 2008. Indeed, a statistical test fails to reject the hypothesis 
that the trends were parallel.
10
 After 2008, the trends diverge: disability entry rates 
increase slightly (and then decrease for total disability) for those unaffected by the 
reform whereas the rates skyrocket for those affected by the reform. We interpret this as 
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 Formally, we tested the parallel trends assumption by interacting year fixed effects with a <35 PAC 




suggestive evidence that the reform significantly increased the present value of 
disability benefits for those with less than 35 PAC years.  
Figure 2A: Partial disability inflow 2001-2011 (men) 
 
Figure 2B: Total disability inflow 2001-2011 (men) 
 






Figure 2D: Total disability rates 2001-2011 (women) 
 
Note: Calculated from the Continuous Sample of Working Lives (Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales).  
3. THEORETICAL MODEL BEFORE AND AFTER THE 2008 REFORM 
In this section, we introduce a theoretical model to understand how the incentives to 
apply for disability benefits changed after the introduction of the 2008 reform. The goal 
of this model is to show a stylized illustration of the tradeoffs facing potential claimants 
before and after the reform. Burkhauser et al. (2003) show that the individual’s decision 
to apply for disability can be represented by using either a value option model or a 
dynamic programming model. As in Burkhauser et al. (2004), we used the second 
method and applied the Bellman principle of optimality.  
3.1 The model before the reform  
We consider a working life cycle setting for partially disabled individuals characterized 
by a deterministic age, t, between 18 and 65 years old (before retirement at age m). 
Time is discrete and the economy is in steady-state. An individual becomes disabled at 
each age with probability   . Then, a disabled person can either be officially disabled 
and receiving disability benefits (D) or not (N). The nonofficially disabled individual 
must decide whether to apply for D-status. We assume that nonofficially disabled 
workers have a specific productivity level z, which is independent and identically 
distributed across age, with a cumulative distribution function F(z) and support [0,z
max
]. 
Thus, the income of this type of worker has both an idiosyncratic component, z, and an 
aggregate component,   
 . Moreover, because of the disability condition, there is a 
relative cost of being non-officially disabled    . This parameter captures the 
productivity gap with respect to the nondisabled status.  
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The individual discounts future payoffs at a discount rate  . All individuals who are 
officially disabled receive a pension equivalent to a proportion α of their average wage 
for the years previous to becoming disabled    plus the wage   
 . Officially disabled 
workers retain disability status in perpetuity. In contrast to Burkhauser et al. (2004), 
which models the US, we did not consider the decision to apply to the disability system 
within the context of the 2008 Spanish reform. The application process in Spain has less 
implicit costs than that in the US because workers do not need to lower their labor 
supply in order to apply (therefore none of the variables in the model are altered by the 
agent’s decision to apply). A second source of costs surrounding the DI application is 
uncertainty regarding acceptance of the application. We are interested in how the 2008 
reform changes disability, and the reform did not change the rules governing the 
acceptance process. For these reasons, we placed the decision to apply outside the 
model.  
The individual's value of not officially disabled,    and the workers’ values of being 
officially disabled,   , were used in the following two Bellman equations to describe 
the model: 
          
                             
    
     
                (1) 
         
                      (2) 
At the beginning of each new age, t+1, job productivity, z, is drawn from the general 
distribution F(z) with [0,z
max
]. Individuals decide to become officially disabled if, for a 
given threshold level,         the present-discounted return of being non-officially 
disabled,        , is lower than the value of being officially disabled,   . Formally, the 
application rule is:  
          ,                                                          (3) 
where            is the probability of becoming officially disabled at age t+1.   
An increase in     will generate the incentive to become officially disabled since it 
increases the value of  .  
3.2 The model after the reform 
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Post reform, the regulatory base,    , is now multiplied by a fraction          that 
increases with the PAC years. For simplicity, we assumed that the contributed years,    
is exogenous. Since          decreases with t and increases with  , individuals with 
several or long periods without contributing to the Social Security System will have a 
decreasing number of PAC years and will, at some point, go below the 35 years 
necessary to receive 100 percent of the benefits. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that, 
after the reform, the decision of applying for disability benefits not only depends on 
         but also on the expected future value of     along the working lifecycle. In 
detail, if the non-officially disabled individual expects that          will change during 
the following years, then, for a given value of         , he or she can modify his or her 
decision to become an officially disabled individual. To capture this scenario, we 
assume that the value of being disabled,    , is now adjusted by the expected value 
                    of the individual’s working lifecycle, where      is the 
expected number of contributory years for retirement at age m. Moreover, for 
simplicity, we assume that      is given. Thus,                   means that an 
expected low labor force attachment will reduce the future value of being disabled and, 
therefore, the present value of being non-officially disabled. 
Now, the two modified Bellman equations are: 
          
                                           
    
     
                (4) 
                 
                    (5) 
The reform has an ambiguous effect on the incentives to apply for disability benefits. 
This result can be explained by the presence of two effects that go in the opposite 
direction of one another. On the one hand, a lower value of          due to a reduction 
in the number of PAC years will reduce the value of being an officially disabled worker, 
reducing the incentive to apply for this status and consequently the probability of being 
officially disabled. On the other hand, lower values of             (because of lower 
expected PAC years) reduce the present-discounted return of being non-officially 
disabled,      . As a result, the participation rule (3) tells us that the lower the value of 
           , the higher the probability of applying for disability benefits since for a 
given         , the value of         decreases while    remains constant. In other 
words, the lower the expected value of disability benefits along the working lifecycle, 
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the higher the probability of applying to the disability system during the current year. 
Notice that since      cannot be lower than     , then                  for all 
t. Thus, the expected value of contributed years      will be equal to the actual      
value only if the individual will contribute to the Social Security System during the rest 
of his or her working life. In summary, our theoretical model suggests that those 
individuals with an expected lower labor force attachment for the remainder of their 
career will have a higher incentive to apply for disability benefits, increasing the DI 
inflow as a result of the reform.  
Online appendix 1 simulates the model under different combinations of          and 
           . The simulated scenarios show that the policy change introduced 
incentives to apply to the DI system for individuals who expect to spend a number of 
periods without contributing to the social security system. The online appendix 1 also 
presents an alternative reform that eliminates the age component from the formula to 
calculate the actual PAC. This new formula is almost identical to the old-age retirement 
formula that already exists in Spain. Our alternative policy scenario shows that the 
probabilities of applying to the disability system are, most of the time, lower than the 
pre reform probability. This result occurs because eliminating the age component from 
the formula avoids the incentives to apply to the DI system for individuals with low 
labor force attachment. 
4. DATA 
We used the Continuous Sample of Working Lives (“Muestra Continua de Vidas 
Laborales”, MCVL), a microeconomic dataset based on administrative records provided 
by the Spanish Social Security Administration. This is a representative sample of 
individuals who have participated in the labor market. Each wave contains a random 
sample of 4 percent of all the individuals who interacted with the social security system 
(by working, receiving unemployment, receiving some type of pension, or being on 
disability) in the previous year. We combined the data from 6 waves starting with the 
2006 wave and ending with the 2011 wave.
11
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 It is rare that an individual would live in Spain for a period of six years and not interact with the SSA in 
some fashion. Other researchers have found that the MCVL is representative of the population. According 
to Ramos-Muñoz (2007) and Garcia Perez (2008), when comparing the LFS (Spanish Labour Force 
Survey) and the MCVL, the authors conclude that both datasets provide information of similar individuals 
and that the distribution of the employed population is extremely similar in both datasets. 
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The MCVL contains retrospective information on the entire employment and pension 
history of workers, including the exact duration and characteristics of employment, 
unemployment, disability and retirement spells. There is also information on personal 
characteristics, such as age, gender, nationality and level of education. Although the 
first wave was sampled in 2006, given the retrospective nature of the data, we are able 
to set 2001 as the first year of observation. Individuals were removed from our sample 
after their first year on disability because including individuals past the first year of 
disability would confound the effects on disability entrance with effects on disability 
retention.
12
 We also excluded individuals who entered the disability system due to a 
working accident because they are not affected by the policy change.
13
 We merged our 
individual data with macroeconomic variables from the Spanish “Instituto Nacional de 
Estadistica” to capture the economic business cycle.  
Table 2: Summary Statistics by PAC years 
Panel A: Men         
            





Age 43.5 42.2 46.4 42.9 42.2 
 
-8.94 -8.65 -8.83 -8.76 -9.15 
Experience (years) 15.6 18.7 9.1 10.6 14.9 
 
-9.99 -9.4 -7.85 -8.76 -9.29 
High school or 
more 
87.50% 92.01% 77.95% 80.50% 89.47% 
   
   
Sector 
  
   
High Tech Man. 13.10% 16.32% 6.10% 7.20% 11.30% 
Low Tech Man. 7.53% 8.48% 5.52% 5.60% 6.60% 
High Tech 18.05% 20.03% 13.83% 16.30% 22.50% 
Trade 13.51% 15.05% 10.20% 10.80% 12.40% 
Hotels/Catering 4.90% 4.12% 6.55% 6.50% 4.80% 
Other Low Tech 11.73% 11.73% 11.71% 11.10% 11.30% 
Construction 17.80% 14.19% 25.50% 23.70% 17.70% 
Real Estate 8.77% 7.99% 10.44% 9.90% 9.50% 
   
   
Partial DI Entry 0.26% 0.18% 0.43% 0.30% 0.23% 
Individuals 374784 237748 137036 58795 93489 
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In practice, disability is an absorbing state with less than 0.25 percent of the sample leaving the 
disability system after entering it. 
13
 Additionally, we removed 2979 men and 3763 women from the original sample who did not have any 




Person-years 2982647 2029135 953512 447939 752712 
   
   
Panel B: Women 
 
   
   
   





Age 42.2 39.6 45.2 40.5 38.8 
 
-8.24 -8.65 -8.06 -7.05 -7.13 
Experience (years) 11.6 15.62 6.99 8.16 11.44 
 
-8.84 -8.82 -6.24 -6.98 -7.26 
H.S. or more 80.30% 90.37% 68.21% 74.97% 87.21% 
   
   
Sector 
  
   
High Tech Man. 3.80% 5.36% 2.03% 2.40% 3.86% 
Low Tech Man. 6.62% 6.74% 6.48% 6.32% 5.68% 
High Tech 32.53% 38.34% 25.61% 28.37% 37.42% 
Trade 16.12% 17.94% 13.95% 14.66% 15.70% 
Hotels/Catering 9.03% 5.41% 13.33% 12.07% 7.45% 
Other Low Tech 12.22% 9.03% 16.02% 13.48% 9.89% 
Construction 1.92% 2.04% 1.77% 1.90% 2.16% 
Real Estate 11.67% 11.91% 11.39% 12.07% 12.93% 
   
   
Partial DI Entry 0.18% 0.11% 0.27% 0.16% 0.11% 
Individuals 294684 155704 138980 50021 70554 
Person-years 2272090 1234508 1037582 414470 545855 
 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics stratified by less than 35 PAC years and more 
than 35 PAC years and for individuals within 4 years of the 35 PAC year cut-off.
14
 Our 
sample includes individuals aged 31 to 65 years old; we estimated a separate model for 
men and women. The sample of men included 374,784 individuals (2,982,647 person-
year observations in total). The sample of women included 294,684 individuals 
(2,272,090 person-year observations in total). Individuals with less than 35 PAC years 
were less educated and were concentrated in low skill sectors. By definition, individuals 
with less than 35 PAC years will have lower labor force attachment, which is reflected 
in the experience variable. Given the differences between the two groups, we flexibly 
controlled for all observables in our empirical specification.  
5. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND RESULTS 
5.1 Estimating the effect of the 2008 reform 
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 Figure A2 in online appendix 3 shows the distribution of PAC years in our sample. 
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Our starting point to estimate the effect of the 2008 reform was a simple difference-in-
difference specification. We included person-year observations for individuals between 
the ages of 31 and 65 that were observed in the years 2001 through 2011 from the 
MCVL. We estimated disability entrance separately for men and women and for partial 
and total disability, using equations of the form: 
                                           
                   (8) 
where     is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual, i, in year t and region j 
receives disability. We included both province (     and year fixed effects (    . 
Treatment is a dummy variable equal to 1 if an individual has less than 35 PAC years 
whereas post is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation occurs after the reform, 
i.e., in the years 2008-2011. The coefficient of interest is then   , which will be the 
effect of the reform on disability entry for individuals whose benefits were reduced as a 
result of the reform. A crucial assumption in identifying the effect of the reform is that 
our outcome variable (disability entry) would have followed the same trend in the 
treatment (those with less than 35 PAC years) and control (those with more than 35 
PAC years) groups in the absence of the policy change. Although we have shown in 
section 2 that both groups exhibited similar trends prior to the reform, Table 2 revealed 
stark differences between the groups. To begin to account for these differences, we 
included a rich set of individual and region-level controls (   . At the individual level, 
we controlled for age decile, a dummy for recent job separation, experience decile, a 
proxy for wages (average Social Security contributions at the last firm), education, and 
sector fixed effects. At the regional level, we controlled for the unemployment rate. 
An additional method of accounting for differences between the treatment and control 
groups is to limit the sample to a more comparable subset. To this end, we report results 
for the sample of individuals with between 31 and 39 PAC years. Although this group 
still exhibits some differences between those above the 35 PAC year cutoff and those 
below, this subsample will consist of more comparable individuals than the entire 
sample.
15
 We also report results from a preprocessing method that reweights the data 
such that the relevant covariates are balanced between the treatment and control groups, 
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 Another possible control group could be those individuals with a PAC of less than 15 years. However, 
there are very few individuals in this category, and they are extremely different from the individuals who 
have more than 15 PAC years, so we cannot use them as a reliable control group. Furthermore, we do not 
have data on non-contributory disability beneficiaries, which could potentially also constitute a relevant 
control group.  
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thus making the estimated treatment effect independent of the covariates. Preprocessed 
data also have the advantage of being less model dependent than other techniques. To 
achieve data reweighting, we used entropy balancing, as described by Hainmueller 
(2012). Entropy balancing directly incorporates covariate balance into the weight 
function and allows for a large set of balance constraints. Therefore, entropy balancing 
delivers covariate distributions of the treatment and control groups in the preprocessed 
data that match all prespecified covariate moments.
16
  
5.2 Primary Results 
Table 3 reports the marginal effects from a logistic regression of equation (8) for the 
partial disability group, whereas Table 4 reports the results for the total disability group. 
Panel A displays the results for men whereas Panel B displays the results for women. In 
column (1), the marginal effect of the interaction between the treatment group and the 
post treatment dummy is positive and statistically significant at conventional levels for 
the baseline sample (columns 1-3). Men affected by the reform were 46 percent (22 
percent for women) more likely to be on permanent partial disability following the 
reform and 55 percent (46 percent for women) more likely to be on total disability 
(these percentages are calculated using the mean of the dependent variable, which is 
also reported in the table). In columns 4-6, we show the results for the sample that is 
limited to individuals with between 31 and 39 PAC years, and in columns 7-9, we 
display the results when the observations are reweighted to be balanced on covariates. 
These estimates are smaller in magnitude but statistically significant at conventional 
levels with the exception of the partial disability sample of women. Overall, the results 
suggest that the reform substantially increased disability entry. 
The primary possible confounding factor in our analysis is the financial crisis. Although 
the reform was implemented 10 months before the onset of the Great Recession, the 
bulk of the years after the reform overlap with the crisis years. Research has shown that 
disability rates are countercyclical with the economy (Rege et al. 2009; Black et al. 
2002). However, in Spain, aggregate disability rates did not increase after the financial 
crisis, and in our microdata, we did not observe a large increase in disability entry 
following the crisis for our control group. Further, we controlled for both year fixed 
effects and the region-level unemployment rate, which should account for the bulk of 
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the crisis’ effect on disability entry. However, our treatment group has low labor force 
attachment, and it is possible that the global financial crisis disproportionately affected 
them. Our estimated effect of the reform may then be merely the effect of the financial 
crisis not accounted for by year fixed effects and the local unemployment rate. In an 
attempt to further control for the financial crisis, we allowed the effect of job loss to 
vary by year by including an interaction between the job loss variable and the year fixed 
effects (columns (2), (5), (8)). In columns (3), (6), and (9), we added an additional 
interaction between the local unemployment rate and job loss. These interactions will 
capture the effect of losing one’s job in a poor economic environment by both place and 
space. Even with this added interaction, we still observe a strong effect of the reform on 
the treated group. We interpret this result as evidence that the reform strongly induced 
disability application for those who were affected by the reform even after accounting 
for deteriorating economic conditions. Before the reform, treated individuals might have 
waited to apply for disability, either hoping to recover from their disability and return to 
their old profession or choosing to search for a job that would accommodate their 
limitations. After the reform, wary of lowering their benefit amount, they prioritized 
applying for disability.  
Table 3: Effect of the 2008 reform on partial disability entry 
Panel A: Men Whole Sample 31-39 PAC years Matching 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Treatment 0.0002* 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0003** 0.0005** 0.0003** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Treat*Post 0.0012*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0006*** 0.0003* 0.0004** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
(0.00012) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
















Mean dep.Var. 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 0.0025 0.0025 0.0025 0.0026 0.0026 0.0026 
Observations 2725971 2725777 2725777 1103679 1103679 1103679 2725971 2725971 2725971 
Panel A: Women Whole Sample 31-39 PAC years Matching 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Treatment 0.0003** 0.0004** 0.0004*** 0.0002* 0.0002* 0.0002* -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Treat*Post 0.0004*** 0.0003** 0.0003** 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007* 0.0005 0.0005 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
















Mean dep.Var. 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 
Observations 2083595 2083529 2083529 889992 889967 889967 2083595 2083595 2083595 
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***p<.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Notes: The regressions in columns 1-6 include the following additional covariates: average wage at 
previous firm, regional unemployment rate, region and year fixed effects, total employment spells, 
dummy variables for experience decile, age decile, sector, job separation dummy and a high school 
graduate dummy variable. Columns 7-9 are balanced on the following covariates: average wage at 
previous firm, regional unemployment rate, region and year fixed effects, total employment spells, 
dummy variables for age decile, sector, job separation dummy and a high school graduate dummy 
variable. Columns 8 and 9 are further balanced on the marked interaction terms. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level. 
 
Table 4: The effect of the 2008 reform on total disability entry 
Panel A: Men Whole Sample 31-39 PAC years Matching 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Treatment 0.000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Treat*Post 0.0011*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0007*** 0.0005** 0.0005*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 
(0.00011) (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
















Mean dep.Var. 0.0020 0.0020 0.0020 0.0021 0.0021 0.0021 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Observations 2714116 2714020 2714116 1098833 1098790 1098790 2714116 2714116 2714116 
Panel A: Women Whole Sample 31-39 PAC years Matching 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Treatment 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0012*** -0.0012*** -0.0012*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Treat*Post 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0005** 0.0003** 0.0003** 0.0003** 0.0013*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 
 
(0.00010) (0.00011) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
















Mean dep.Var. 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 
Observations 2074848 2074848 2074808 888272 888262 888262 2074848 2074848 2074848 
 
***p<.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Notes: The regressions in columns 1-6 include the following additional covariates: average contributions 
at previous firm, regional unemployment rate, region and year fixed effects, total employment spells, 
dummy variables for experience decile, age decile, sector, job separation dummy variable and a high 
school graduate dummy variable. Columns 7-9 are balanced on the following covariates: average wage at 
previous firm, regional unemployment rate, region and year fixed effects, total employment spells, 
dummy variables for age decile, sector, job separation dummy variable and a high school graduate 
dummy variable. Columns 8 and 9 are further balanced on the marked interaction terms. 
Standard errors in parentheses clustered at the individual level. 
  
5.3 Heterogeneous Effects 
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In this section, we examine how the probability of disability entry differs by benefit 
level. Table 5, columns (1) and (2), includes an interaction between treatment in the 
post period and the individuals’ social security contributions at their previous firm (our 
wage proxy).
17,18
 Ceteris paribus, those who separate from their job at higher wage 
levels will have a greater incentive to apply for disability because their benefits will be 
higher than if they wait and either do not find a job or find a job with a lower wage 
(benefits are based on the previous 8 years of wages). The marginal effect of the 
interaction is positive and statistically significant for partial disability and total 
disability for men (Panel A and C, respectively). We found no statistically significant 
effect for women. The lack of an observed effect could be due to the wage data not 
reflecting women’s wages as accurately as men
19
 or, as secondary earners, women may 
not take the benefit level into account in disability application. 
In columns (3) and (4), we explored how the amount of benefits lost affects the 
disability decision. To measure benefits lost, we constructed a variable (lostPAC) that 
represents the number of PAC years lost in the year prior. Individuals with higher 
lostPAC values correspond to low levels of the labor force attachment in the prior year. 
Individuals with larger drops may expect their potential benefits to be further reduced if 
their labor force participation continues to be tenuous and are therefore incentivized to 
apply for disability before their benefits fall further. The interaction between this 
variable and the treatment group in the post period is positive and statistically 
significant for all the observed samples, suggesting that the more PAC years lost in the 
year prior, the more likely the individual was to receive disability. 
Taken together, the results of Table 5 confirm the predictions of the theoretical model. 
For individuals affected by the reform, those with a higher benefit amount (through 
higher wages) and those with the most to lose by waiting to apply for disability (through 
the potential of a lowered PAC percentage in subsequent years) were the most likely to 
enter into disability postreform. 
 
                                                          
17
 Interactions are fully interacted, so all two-way interactions are included in the specification as well. 
18
 Recall that we do not have individual wage data but use a proxy instead (contributions to the SS 
administration). 
19
 This is because the labor market behavior of women is different in several dimensions from the labor 
market behavior of men. For example, women may be more subject to the minimum social security 
contribution (because they are more likely to work part-time and earn lower wages) so that the wage 
proxy that we use (social security contributions) may be a less accurate measure for women. 
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Table 5: Effect of reform on partial disability entry (interactions) 
Partial Disability 


















Year X Job Loss  X  X 
Mean Dep.Var. 0.0026 0.0026 0.0029 0.0029 
Observations 2928561 2928561 2467330 2467330 


















Year X Job Loss  X  X 
Mean Dep.Var. 0.0019 0.0019 0.002 0.002 
Observations 2218512 2218512 1896503 1896503 
Total Disability 


















Year X Job Loss  X  X 
Mean Dep.Var. 0.002 0.002 0.0023 0.0023 
Observations 2915317 2915317 2456876 2456876 




















Year X Job Loss  X  X 
Mean Dep.Var. 0.0013 0.0013 0.0014 0.0014 
Observations 2208637 2208637 1889015 1889015 
 
***p<.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Notes: The regressions in columns 1-4 include the following additional covariates: social security 
contributions at the previous firm, regional unemployment rate, region and year fixed effects, total 
employment spells, dummy variables for experience decile, age decile, sector, job separation dummy and 
a high school graduate dummy variable. Columns 2 and 4 include the marked interaction terms. Reported 
coefficients are from a linear probability model. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the 
individual level. 
 
6. Discussion and the fiscal impact of the 2008 reform        
To ascertain the fiscal impact of the 2008 reform, we performed a simple calculation 
using our main results to obtain an estimate of the monthly burden/savings of the 
reform. The estimates from Table 3, column 3 suggest that the reform resulted in 17,036 
more men receiving partial disability benefits over the three-year period from 2009 to 
2011. These were men added to the disability rolls because of the reform; thus, the 
payments that they received represent the cost of the reform for men’s partial disability. 
However, the government saved money on those who would have entered into the 
disability system regardless of the reform, but entered with lower benefits because of 
the reform. If we assume the disability rate was constant and use the baseline benefits 
for our four groups (partial men, total men, partial women, and total women), we found 
that by 2011, the government was losing approximately 6.8 million Euros on 
individuals who were induced into applying for (and then ultimately received) 
disability. However, the government was saving 18.6 million Euros by paying lower 
benefits to those who would have applied regardless. Therefore, our estimates suggest 
that in the end, the reform did succeed in reducing the amount spent on disability; 
however, these savings were quite small: the 11.8 million net monthly Euros saved by 
the Spanish government is less than two percent of the disability monthly budget. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper adds to the growing body of evidence showing that the design of a disability 
benefit system can have a significant impact on disability entry. We analyzed the 2008 
disability reform in Spain and found that contrary to its intended purpose, the reform 
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increased disability application. The positive effect is because the reform incentivized 
application for those who expected to have low labor force participation in the future. 
Although the absolute value of these individuals’ benefits was decreased by the reform, 
their present value was greater than it would have been in the future after continued low 
labor force participation. Overall, we found that the reform increased partial disability 
application by 46 percent in men and 22 percent in women. However, despite having 
the opposite effect of its intent, the reform had a small impact on government 
expenditures.  
The Spanish system and the 2008 reform demonstrate some of the unexpected effects of 
policy reforms. First, disability receipt is still an absorbing state in Spain, with less than 
1 percent of individuals leaving disability in a given year. Even in a disability system 
with no work disincentive, if the benefit formula depends on both the number of years 
contributed and on age, then unemployed disabled workers are incentivized to apply for 
disability over finding new employment (assuming that they expect their future 
employment probabilities to be low). A final important point is that in the context of a 
weak job market, individuals may find disability application appealing despite lowered 
benefit levels. Overall, the 2008 Spanish reform highlights the difficulties of disability 
design; thus, governments with disability reform agendas should be wary of unintended 
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ONLINE APPENDIX 1: Extended Theoretical Model 
To illustrate the model’s predictions in section 3, we simulate the reform considering 
different combinations of          and             for an individual 45 years old.
 20
  
For an easier interpretation, we present the results in terms of      and     . The rest 
of the model’s parameters are shown in Table A1 and have been parameterized using 
the MCVL for the pre-reform period 2004-2007 as well as information from other 
studies.  
Figure A1 shows the simulated post reform probabilities. To evaluate the effectiveness 
of the reform, we need to compare these probabilities with the simulated pre-reform 
probability of 0.0420 when                       .
21
 As we can see, the post 
reform probabilities of applying to the disability status are always higher to the 
simulated one during the pre reform. More in detail, the simulations show that a 45 
years old individual with a      lower than 35 or with a value higher to      displays 
higher probability of applying to the disability system after the reform is introduced. 
Only those individuals with a            and with no expected change in their labor 
force attachment,                 will keep disability application at the same level 
than before the reform.  
Also notice that during an economic recession many individuals should expect a low 
labor force attachment, increasing the probability of applying to the system.  In other 
words, for a given     , a reduction in the      increases the probability of applying 
to the disability system. Individuals with a lower value of      expect to work less for 
the remainder of their working life and face a rapidly decreasing PAC years and 
therefore PAC percentage. These are the individuals who will have the greatest 
incentive to apply and the simulation bears this out. An individual with a PAC of 35 
years,            , will experience an increase from 0.0420 to 0.0699 in the 
probability of applying for DI if his      falls from 35 to 15 years (            
falls from 1.0 to 0.5).    
                                                          
20
We consider a 45 years old individual because he nearly represents the median age of the population in 
Spain. Similar patterns to the ones observed in Figure A1 are obtained when considering other ages 
(although with different probabilities). We would like to emphasize that the numerical scenarios 
presented here pretend to illustrate the main theoretical predictions from the model, and not to replicates 
the empirical estimations in section 5. 
21
 Notice that there is only one pre-reform probability that equals 0.042 because PAC years did not exist 
before the reform. 
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Next we consider changes in current level of PAC years. The simulation shows that the 
closer an individual is to the upper bound of 35 years, the higher the probability of 
applying for disability benefits. This represents the absolute value of the benefits, in that 
those with a higher PAC percentage,           are more likely to apply for disability 
than those with a lower value. For example, a 45 years old individual with      and 
     of 15 years,                           shows a probability of applying 
to the DI of 0.0633. In turn, this probability increases to 0.0699 if the PAC increases 
from 15 to 35 years,           . 
 
Figure A1: Simulated effects of the reform under different scenarios of      and 
    . Probability of applying to the disability system. 
 
Note: Since EPAC cannot be higher than PAC by definition, the probabilities of these combinations are 
not defined. 
 
Table A1: Parameterization of the theoretical model for a given individual 
  
 Parameters   Value   Definition  
   0.070 Disability probability shock 
       Discount factor 
         





































   1.20 Regulatory base  
  0.55 Percentage applied to the regulatory base 
  
  1.00 Normalized wage of the officially disabled  
  
  1.20 Wage of the non-officially disabled 
σ 0.1 Standard deviation of log(z) 
η 0.00 Log normalization of the mean of z 
   
 
Note: In this parametrization, we normalize   
   to the unity. Then,    
   matches an average wage gap of 
21 percent between a disabled and nondisabled individual (Cervini-Plá, Silva, and Vall-Castello, 2012). 
The regulatory base is set equal to   
 . The discount factor    is set to match the average observed 
probability of applying to disability benefits before the reform (0.042). The working disability costs    
assumes that the non-officially disabled individual has a degree of disability of 33 percent, which is the 
minimum level of disability requires to applied for disability benefits. The parameter   is taken from the 
Spanish Disability System. Finally, the logarithm of the idiosyncratic productivity z is assumed to have 
normal distribution with mean η=0 and standard deviation σ=0.1    
 
Alternative policy scenario: abolishing incentives to join the DI system 
We next simulate an alternative reform that would not have the incentives to apply to 
the DI system for individuals with a low labor force attachment. We propose a similar 
policy to the one implemented in 2008 but we exclude the age component (65-Age) 
from the formula to calculate the actual PAC. Thus, the new formula is almost identical 
to the old-age benefit formula that already exists in Spain; 
                           
                         
 
This is the only parameter that we change and we leave the PAC percentage unchanged. 
That is, we assume that the corresponding PAC percentage follows the same rule as the 
one introduced in 2008. Table A2 shows the simulated results for a 45 year-old 
individual under the presence of two different labor force attachment scenarios 
(following the simulations above).  The first one is a high labor force attachment 
scenario and assumes that the individual will work every year until retirement. The 
second is a low labor force attachment scenario that assumes individual will only work 
five more years until retirement.  
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Table A2 shows the simulated results. In the first block we include the simulated 
probabilities of applying to the disability system after the 2008 reform while in the 
second block we show the simulated probabilities under the alternative policy scenario 
that we are proposing, which excludes the age component from the PAC formula.  
The most important result is that, in our alternative policy scenario, the probabilities of 
applying to the disability system (Prob) are, most of the time, lower than the pre reform 
probability. In other words, most of the simulated probabilities in the second block are 
lower than the estimated probability of 0.0420 with PAC=EPAC=1. In contrast, in the 
actual system the probabilities are higher or equal to the pre reform one (see the first 
block).   
Notice that this result also implies that the alternative system shows lower probabilities 
than the actual system. For example, in the actual system (first block), a 45 year-old 
with 10 years of contributions has a PAC of 30 years with expected PAC of 15 (30) 
years in the low (high) labor attachment scenarios. In these two scenarios, the 
probabilities of applying to the disability system are 0.0698 and 0.0470, in each case. In 
contrast, in the alternative scenario proposed (second block), the actual PAC for this 
individual is reduced from 30 to 10 while the expected PAC will remain unchanged. In 
this case, the probabilities for applying to DI fall to 0.0633 and 0.000, in each case. The 
intuition behind this result is simple; eliminating the age component from the PAC 
formula reduces the actual PAC and, at the same time, ensures that the expected PAC 
(EPAC) will not be lower than the observed PAC, implying that E(θ)≥θ at any given 
age and number of years contributed. Therefore, since the individual will not take into 
account a reduction in the future PAC during his working life, the incentive to apply to 
the disability system falls.  
It is important to emphasize that the alternative reform we present in this section is not 
necessarily more efficient than the 2008 reform. Although it is true that this alternative 
scenario increases the disincentive to apply for disabled workers with relatively low 
levels of disability but with low labor-force attachment, it can be the case that the 
benefits do not go to those who deserve them the most since the disincentive to apply 
can also be higher for people with low labor force attachment due to bad health 
conditions. Our goal here is not to target a more efficient reform but to show the 
sensitivity of the DI system with respect to a scenario that eliminates the age component 




Table A2. The effect of the proposed alternative policy scenario on the probability 
of applying to the disability system. 
The Spanish Disability System under the real reform 
        Low LFAS High LFAS 
Age Contrib. years PAC θ EPAC 
 
E(θ) Prob  EPAC 
 
E(θ) Prob  
45 10 30 0.9 15 0.5 0.0698 30 0.9 0.0470 
45 15 35 1 20 0.65 0.0693 35 1 0.0420 
45 20 40 1 25 0.8 0.0647 40 1 0.0420 
45 25 45 1 30 0.9 0.0554 45 1 0.0420 
45 30 50 1 35 1 0.0420 50 1 0.0420 
Alternative hypothetical reform in the Spanish Disability System 
        Low LFAS High LFAS 
Age Contrib. years PAC θ EPAC 
 
E(θ) Prob  EPAC 
 
E(θ) Prob  
45 10 10 0.5 15 0.5 0.0633 30 0.9 0.0000 
45 15 15 0.5 20 0.65 0.0379 35 1 0.0000 
45 20 20 0.65 25 0.8 0.0080 40 1 0.0041 
45 25 25 0.8 30 0.9 0.0334 45 1 0.0201 
45 30 30 0.9 35 1 0.0322 50 1 0.0322 





ONLINE APPENDIX 2: Differential Effects of Treatment 
In Table A3 we examine how the effects of the reform differed by the amount of 
benefits lost. Recall that after the 2008 reform, for those below the 35 year PAC 
threshold, the amount by which their disability benefits were reduced depends on their 
PAC years. For instance, those with 15 PAC years or lower received 50 percent of their 
previous benefit amount, while those from 16 to 34 PAC years received 53 to 98 
percent depending on their PAC years (Table A4 in online appendix 3 presents the PAC 
years and corresponding percentages). The reform acted like a one-time shock where 
one’s benefit level was dropped to a new lower level. The reform incentivized 
application because an individual’s PAC years would continue to fall if their labor force 
attachment was low. Our theoretical model predicts that disability application should be 
higher for those closer to the 35 PAC year threshold because they stood the most to lose 
over time if their PAC years continued to fall. The model does not suggest the effect of 
one’s distance to the cut-off to be linear, therefore we allow for a flexible functional 
form. We divide the treated group into four sub-groups, those with 15-20 PAC years, 
20-25 PAC years, 25-30 PAC years, and 30-35 PAC years (PAC years is a continuous 
variable). We allow each subgroup to have its own treatment effect. The specification is 
as follows:   
                                                       
                                            
                                                      
                                                          
   
                                                                                                                                (9) 
Where treatment(PAC) are dummy variables equal to 1 if the individual’s PAC years 
are within the specified range. The estimated effects of the various treatment groups are 
similar with the exception of treatment(PAC15-20), which has a consistently lower 
effect on disability entry across gender and types of disability. The estimates in Panel A 
and C, column (1) suggest that males whose PAC years were from 15-20 were 20.3 (31) 
percent more likely to receive partial (total) disability after the reform, while those with 
PAC years from 30-35 were 36 (47) percent more likely to receive partial (total) 
disability post reform. We observe similar results for women on partial (total) disability 
entry: there is a 9 (29) percent effect for females with 15-20 PAC years compared to a 
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36 (60) percent effect for those 30-35 PAC years. The effects for the other PAC year 
ranges (20-25, 25-30) are similar to those found for the 30-35 group. The results of table 
6 suggest that the effect of the reform incentivized application (and therefore increased 
entry) for those affected but the effect was not as salient for those with 15-20 PAC 
years. This finding is consistent with the dynamic nature of disability impacting the 
decision to apply. After the reform, the benefit reduction was capped at 50 percent and 
those with 15 PAC years had already reached that cap and those with 16-20 PAC years 
are already close to the cap, hence they do not have as much benefits to lose as 
compared to those with more PAC years.  
Table A3: Effect of reform on disability entry by PAC years 
Partial Disability 
   Panel A: Men 
   (1) (2) 
PAC(15-20)*post 0.0012*** 0.0008*** 
 
(.0002) (.0002) 
PAC(20-25)*post 0.0016*** 0.0013*** 
 
(.0002) (.0002) 
PAC(25-30)*post 0.0012*** 0.0009*** 
 
(.0002) (.0002) 
PAC(30-35)*post 0.0009*** 0.0006*** 
 
(.0002) (.0002) 
Year X Job Loss 
 
X 
Mean dep. Var. (PAC(15-20)) 0.0059 0.0059 
Mean dep. Var. (PAC(20-25)) 0.0044 0.0044 
Mean dep. Var. (PAC(25-30)) 0.0035 0.0035 
Mean dep. Var. (PAC(30-35)) 0.0025 0.0025 
Observations 2725971 2725777 
   Panel B: Women 
   (1) (2) 
PAC(15-20)*post 0.0005*** 0.0003** 
 
(.0002) (.0002) 
PAC(21-25)*post 0.0002 0.0001 
 
(.0002) (.0002) 
PAC(26-30)*post 0.0004** 0.0003 
 
(.0002) (.0002) 
PAC(31-35)*post 0.0005** 0.0003 
 
(.0002) (.0002) 
Year X Job Loss 
 
X 
Mean dep. Var. (PAC(15-20)) 0.0053 0.0053 
Mean dep. Var. (PAC(20-25)) 0.0031 0.0031 
Mean dep. Var. (PAC(25-30)) 0.0022 0.0022 
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Mean dep. Var. (PAC(30-35)) 0.0014 0.0014 
Observations 2083595 2083529 
   Total Disability 
   Panel C: Men 
   (1) (2) 
PAC(15-20)*post 0.0013*** 0.0011*** 
 
(.0002) (.0002) 
PAC(21-25)*post 0.0014*** 0.0012*** 
 
(.0002) (.0002) 
PAC(26-30)*post 0.0011*** 0.0009*** 
 
(.0002) (.0002) 
PAC(31-35)*post 0.0009*** 0.0007*** 
 
(.0002) (.0002) 
Year X Job Loss 
 
X 
Mean dep. Var. (PAC(15-20)) 0.0042 0.0042 
Mean dep. Var. (PAC(20-25)) 0.0031 0.0031 
Mean dep. Var. (PAC(25-30)) 0.0026 0.0026 
Mean dep. Var. (PAC(30-35)) 0.0019 0.0019 
Observations 2714116 2714020 
   Panel D: Women 
   (1) (2) 
PAC(15-20)*post 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 
 
(.0002) (.0002) 
PAC(21-25)*post 0.0008*** 0.0006*** 
 
(.0002) (.0002) 
PAC(26-30)*post 0.0006*** 0.0004*** 
 
(.0002) (.0002) 
PAC(31-35)*post 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 
 
(.0001) (.0001) 
Year X Job Loss 
 
X 
Mean dep. Var. (PAC(15-20)) 0.0021 0.0021 
Mean dep. Var. (PAC(20-25)) 0.0013 0.0013 
Mean dep. Var. (PAC(25-30)) 0.0012 0.0012 
Mean dep. Var. (PAC(30-35)) 0.0010 0.0010 
Observations 2074848 2074808 
   ***p<.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
Notes: Columns 1-2 regressions include the following additional covariates: average contributions at 
previous firm, regional unemployment rate, region and year fixed effects, total employment spells, 
dummy variables for experience decile, age decile, sector, job separation dummy and a high school 
graduate dummy variable. Columns 2 include the marked interaction terms. 





ONLINE APPENDIX 3: Additional Figures and Tables 
Figure A2. Distribution of the PAC years in our sample 
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Table A5: Entropy Balancing Moments 
Panel A: Partial Disability Men 
 
Unbalanced Balanced 
Variable >35 PAC <35 PAC >35 PAC <35 PAC 
Age 42.04 46.4 46.4 46.4 
 
(74.07) (78.04) (92.43) (78.0) 
High School or more 0.9197 0.7812 0.7813 0.781 
 
(0.07388) (0.1709) (0.1709) (.171) 
Base wage at firm 1496 1221 1221 1221 
 
(682853) (534729) (612309) (534729) 
Local unemployment rate 12.23 12.23 12.23 12.23 
 
(33.69) (32.72) (33.14) (32.72) 
=1 if lost job 0.008963 0.02864 0.02864 0.029 
 
(0.008883) (0.02782) (0.02782) (0.0278) 
Sector 
    
     High Tech Man. 0.163 0.06135 0.06141 0.0613 
 
(0.1364) (0.05759) (0.05764) (0.0576) 
Low Tech Man. 0.08459 0.05469 0.05469 0.0547 
 
(0.07744) (0.0517) (0.0517) (0.0517) 
High Tech 0.1992 0.1387 0.1387 0.1387 
 
(0.1595) (0.1195) (0.1195) (0.1195) 
Trade 0.1497 0.102 0.102 0.102 
 
(0.1273) (0.09157) (0.09157) (0.0916) 
Hotels/Catering 0.04143 0.06571 0.0657 0.0657 
 
(0.03971) (0.06139) (0.06139) (0.0614) 
Other Low Tech 0.1176 0.118 0.118 0.118 
 
(0.1037) (0.1041) (0.1041) (0.104) 
Construction 0.1436 0.2563 0.2563 0.256 
 
(0.123) (0.1906) (0.1906) (0.191) 
Real Estate 0.07995 0.1044 0.1044 0.104 
 
(0.07356) (0.09354) (0.09353) (0.0935) 
Region 
    
     Aragon 0.03041 0.02511 0.02511 0.02511 
 
(0.02948) (0.02448) (0.02448) (0.02448) 
Asturias 0.02402 0.01897 0.01897 0.01897 
 
(0.02344) (0.01861) (0.01861) (0.01861) 
Baleares 0.02102 0.03122 0.03122 0.03122 
 
(0.02058) (0.03025) (0.03025) (0.03025) 
Canarias 0.04105 0.05141 0.05141 0.05141 
 
(0.03936) (0.04877) (0.04877) (0.04877) 
Cantabria 0.01368 0.0106 0.0106 0.0106 
 
(0.01349) (0.01048) (0.01048) (0.01048) 




(0.05597) (0.04709) (0.04709) (0.04709) 
Castmancha 0.03827 0.0399 0.0399 0.0399 
 
(0.0368) (0.0383) (0.0383) (0.0383) 
Catalunya 0.1831 0.1661 0.1661 0.1661 
 
(0.1495) (0.1385) (0.1385) (0.1385) 
Valencia 0.0975 0.09927 0.09927 0.09927 
 
(0.08799) (0.08942) (0.08942) (0.08942) 
Extremadura 0.02075 0.02568 0.02568 0.02568 
 
(0.02032) (0.02502) (0.02502) (0.02502) 
Galicia 0.05398 0.0566 0.0566 0.0566 
 
(0.05106) (0.0534) (0.0534) (0.0534) 
Madrid 0.1645 0.1477 0.1477 0.1477 
 
(0.1374) (0.1259) (0.1259) (0.1259) 
Murcia 0.02491 0.03099 0.03098 0.03099 
 
(0.02429) (0.03003) (0.03002) (0.03003) 
Navarra 0.01574 0.01148 0.01149 0.01148 
 
(0.0155) (0.01135) (0.01135) (0.01135) 
Paisbasco 0.06504 0.04282 0.04283 0.04282 
 
(0.06081) (0.04099) (0.041) (0.04099) 
Rioja 0.006896 0.005811 0.005812 0.005811 






>35 PAC <35 PAC >35 PAC <35 PAC 
Age 39.5 45.21 45.21 45.21 
 
(55.03) (65.18) (82.11) (65.18) 
High School or more 0.9036 0.6836 0.6837 0.6836 
 
(0.08709) (0.2163) (0.2163) (0.2163) 
Base wage at firm 1328 945.9 945.9 945.9 
 
(642599) (453919) (453565) (453919) 
Local unemployment rate 12.17 12.05 12.05 12.05 
 
(34.38) (32.47) (32.9) (32.47) 
=1 if lost job 0.01516 0.03193 0.03193 0.03193 
 
(0.01493) (0.03092) (0.03092) (0.03092) 
Sector 
    
     High Tech Man. 0.0532 0.01985 0.01985 0.01985 
 
(0.05037) (0.01945) (0.01946) (0.01945) 
Low Tech Man. 0.06706 0.06243 0.06243 0.06243 
 
(0.06256) (0.05853) (0.05853) (0.05853) 
High Tech 0.3833 0.2603 0.2603 0.2603 
 
(0.2364) (0.1925) (0.1925) (0.1925) 
Trade 0.179 0.1389 0.1389 0.1389 
 
(0.147) (0.1196) (0.1196) (0.1196) 
Hotels/Catering 0.05465 0.1348 0.1348 0.1348 
 
(0.05166) (0.1166) 0.1166) 0.1166) 
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Other Low Tech 0.09055 0.1624 0.1624 0.1624 
 
(0.08235) (0.136) 0.136) 0.136) 
Construction 0.02042 0.01753 0.01753 0.01753 
 
(0.02) (0.01722) 0.01722) 0.01722) 
Real Estate 0.1193 0.1144 0.1144 0.1144 
 
(0.1051) (0.1013) (0.1013) (0.1013) 
Region 
    
     Aragon 0.03276 0.02755 0.02755 0.02755 
 
(0.03168) (0.02679) (0.02679) (0.02679) 
Asturias 0.02091 0.02422 0.02422 0.02422 
 
(0.02047) (0.02363) (0.02363) (0.02363) 
Baleares 0.02412 0.0291 0.0291 0.0291 
 
(0.02354) (0.02825) (0.02825) (0.02825) 
Canarias 0.04147 0.05122 0.05122 0.05122 
 
(0.03975) (0.0486) (0.0486) (0.0486) 
Cantabria 0.01229 0.01188 0.01188 0.01188 
 
(0.01214) (0.01174) (0.01174) (0.01174) 
Castleon 0.04992 0.05251 0.05251 0.05251 
 
(0.04743) (0.04975) (0.04975) (0.04975) 
Castmancha 0.02977 0.03623 0.03623 0.03623 
 
(0.02888) (0.03492) (0.03492) (0.03492) 
Catalunya 0.2113 0.1703 0.1703 0.1703 
 
(0.1666) (0.1413) (0.1413) (0.1413) 
Valencia 0.09724 0.1034 0.1034 0.1034 
 
(0.08779) (0.09271) (0.09271) (0.09271) 
Extremadura 0.01515 0.02289 0.02289 0.02289 
 
(0.01492) (0.02236) (0.02236) (0.02236) 
Galicia 0.05298 0.05844 0.05844 0.05844 
 
(0.05018) (0.05503) (0.05503) (0.05503) 
Madrid 0.1892 0.1605 0.1605 0.1605 
 
(0.1534) (0.1348) (0.1348) (0.1348) 
Murcia 0.02063 0.02865 0.02865 0.02865 
 
(0.0202) (0.02783) (0.02783) (0.02783) 
Navarra 0.0158 0.01406 0.01406 0.01406 
 
(0.01555) (0.01386) (0.01386) (0.01386) 
Paisbasco 0.0596 0.05126 0.05126 0.05126 
 
(0.05605) (0.04863) (0.04863) (0.04863) 
Rioja 0.007208 0.006756 0.006756 0.006756 
  (0.007156) (0.00671) (0.00671) (0.00671) 
Panel B: Total Disability Men 
 
Unbalanced Balanced 
Variable >35 PAC <35 PAC >35 PAC <35 PAC 
Age 42.05 46.39 46.39 46.39 
 
(74.31) (78.46) (92.69) (78.46) 




(0.07372) (0.1708) (0.1708) (0.1708) 
Base wage at firm 1496 1223 1223 1223 
 
(684279) (538002) (615045) (538002) 
Local unemployment rate 12.23 12.22 12.22 12.22 
 
(33.72) (32.74) (33.13) (32.74) 
=1 if lost job 0.00878 0.02777 0.02777 0.02777 
 
(0.008703) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Sector 
    
     High Tech Man. 0.1623 0.06086 0.06092 0.06086 
 
(0.1359) (0.05716) (0.05721) (0.05716) 
Low Tech Man. 0.08436 0.0547 0.0547 0.0547 
 
(0.07724) (0.05171) (0.05171) (0.05171) 
High Tech 0.2004 0.1405 0.1405 0.1405 
 
(0.1602) (0.1208) (0.1208) (0.1208) 
Trade 0.15 0.1023 0.1023 0.1023 
 
(0.1275) (0.09183) (0.09183) (0.09183) 
Hotels/Catering 0.04156 0.06603 0.06603 0.06603 
 
(0.03983) (0.06167) (0.06167) (0.06167) 
Other Low Tech 0.1172 0.1184 0.1183 0.1184 
 
(0.1034) (0.1043) (0.1043) (0.1043) 
Construction 0.1422 0.2518 0.2518 0.2518 
 
(0.122) (0.1884) (0.1884) (0.1884) 
Real Estate 0.08036 0.1048 0.1048 0.1048 
 
(0.0739) (0.09381) (0.0938) (0.09381) 
Region 
    
     Aragon 0.03036 0.02527 0.02527 0.02527 
 
(0.02944) (0.02463) (0.02463) (0.02463) 
Asturias 0.02411 0.01907 0.01907 0.01907 
 
(0.02353) (0.01871) (0.01871) (0.01871) 
Baleares 0.02096 0.03109 0.03108 0.03109 
 
(0.02052) (0.03012) (0.03012) (0.03012) 
Canarias 0.04098 0.0512 0.05119 0.0512 
 
(0.0393) (0.04858) (0.04857) (0.04858) 
Cantabria 0.01356 0.01056 0.01056 0.01056 
 
(0.01338) (0.01045) (0.01045) (0.01045) 
Castleon 0.0593 0.04972 0.04972 0.04972 
 
(0.05579) (0.04725) (0.04725) (0.04725) 
Castmancha 0.03821 0.03966 0.03966 0.03966 
 
(0.03675) (0.03809) (0.03809) (0.03809) 
Catalunya 0.1837 0.1678 0.1678 0.1678 
 
(0.15) (0.1396) (0.1396) (0.1396) 
Valencia 0.09731 0.09921 0.09921 0.09921 
 
(0.08784) (0.08937) (0.08937) (0.08937) 




(0.02031) (0.02477) (0.02477) (0.02477) 
Galicia 0.0535 0.05562 0.05562 0.05562 
 
(0.05064) (0.05253) (0.05253) (0.05253) 
Madrid 0.165 0.1485 0.1485 0.1485 
 
(0.1378) (0.1265) (0.1265) (0.1265) 
Murcia 0.02487 0.03078 0.03078 0.03078 
 
(0.02425) (0.02984) (0.02984) (0.02984) 
Navarra 0.01575 0.01155 0.01155 0.01155 
 
(0.0155) (0.01142) (0.01142) (0.01142) 
Paisbasco 0.06499 0.04299 0.04299 0.04299 
 
(0.06076) (0.04114) (0.04114 (0.04114) 
Rioja 0.006852 0.005814 0.005815 0.005814 





Variable >35 PAC <35 PAC >35 PAC <35 PAC 
Age 39.5 45.15 45.15 45.15 
 
(55.07) (64.97) (82.22) (64.97) 
High School or more 0.9046 0.6863 0.6863 0.6863 
 
(0.08633) (0.2153) (0.2153) (0.2153) 
Base wage at firm 1329 946.2 946.2 946.2 
 
(643762) (455370) (455742) (455370) 
Local unemployment rate 12.16 12.06 12.06 12.06 
 
(34.38) (32.57) (32.97) (32.57) 
=1 if lost job 0.01513 0.03158 0.03158 0.03158 
 
(0.0149) (0.03058) (0.03058) (0.03058) 
Sector 
    
     High Tech Man. 0.0531 0.01976 0.01977 0.01976 
 
(0.05028) (0.01937) (0.01938) (0.01937) 
Low Tech Man. 0.06671 0.06201 0.06201 0.06201 
 
(0.06226) (0.05817) (0.05817) (0.05817) 
High Tech 0.384 0.2612 0.2612 0.2612 
 
(0.2365) (0.193) (0.193) (0.193) 
Trade 0.1788 0.139 0.139 0.139 
 
(0.1468) (0.1197) (0.1197) (0.1197) 
Hotels/Catering 0.05439 0.1342 0.1342 0.1342 
 
(0.05143) (0.1162) (0.1162) (0.1162) 
Other Low Tech 0.09012 0.1607 0.1607 0.1607 
 
(0.08199) (0.1349) (0.1349) (0.1349) 
Construction 0.02042 0.0176 0.0176 0.0176 
 
(0.02) (0.01729) (0.01729) (0.01729) 
Real Estate 0.1198 0.1148 0.1148 0.1148 
 
(0.1054) (0.1016) (0.1016) (0.1016) 
Region 
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Aragon 0.03276 0.02763 0.02763 0.02763 
 
(0.03168) (0.02686) (0.02686) (0.02686) 
Asturias 0.0211 0.02451 0.02451 0.02451 
 
(0.02065) (0.02391) (0.02391) (0.02391) 
Baleares 0.02408 0.02885 0.02885 0.02885 
 
(0.0235) (0.02802) (0.02802) (0.02802) 
Canarias 0.04136 0.05107 0.05107 0.05107 
 
(0.03965) (0.04847) (0.04847) (0.04847) 
Cantabria 0.01228 0.0118 0.0118 0.0118 
 
(0.01213) (0.01166) (0.01166) (0.01166) 
Castleon 0.04982 0.05254 0.05254 0.05254 
 
(0.04734) (0.04978) (0.04978) (0.04978) 
Castmancha 0.02974 0.03615 0.03615 0.03615 
 
(0.02885) (0.03485) (0.03485) (0.03485) 
Catalunya 0.2121 0.1711 0.1711 0.1711 
 
(0.1671) (0.1418) (0.1418) (0.1418) 
Valencia 0.09704 0.1029 0.1029 0.1029 
 
(0.08763) (0.09232) (0.09232) (0.09232) 
Extremadura 0.0151 0.02277 0.02277 0.02277 
 
(0.01488) (0.02225) (0.02225) (0.02225) 
Galicia 0.05259 0.05792 0.05792 0.05792 
 
(0.04982) (0.05457) (0.05457) (0.05457) 
Madrid 0.1894 0.1612 0.1612 0.1612 
 
(0.1535) (0.1352) (0.1352) (0.1352) 
Murcia 0.02062 0.02849 0.02849 0.02849 
 
(0.02019) (0.02768) (0.02768) (0.02768) 
Navarra 0.01582 0.01416 0.01416 0.01416 
 
(0.01557) (0.01396) (0.01396) (0.01396) 
Paisbasco 0.05958 0.05121 0.05121 0.05121 
 
(0.05603) (0.04858) (0.04858) (0.04858) 
Rioja 0.00722 0.00679 0.00679 0.00679 
  (0.007168) (0.006744) (0.006744) (0.006744) 
Notes: columns (1) and (2) display the unbalanced mean and variance of the variable, 
column (3) and (4) displays the mean and variance after re-weighting. 
  
 
